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Abstract

Wage-differentials by education of men and women are examined from African household surveys
to suggest private wage returns to schooling. It is commonly asserted that returns are highest at
primary school levels and decrease at secondary and postsecondary levels, whereas private returns
in six African countries are today highest at the secondary and post secondary levels, and rates are
similar for women as for men. The large public subsidies for postsecondary education in Africa,
therefore, are not needed to motivate students to enroll, and those who have in the past enrolled in
these levels of education are disproportionately from the better-educated families. Higher education
in Africa could be more efficient and more equitably distributed if the children of well-educated
parents paid the public costs of their schooling, and these tuition revenues facilitated the expansion
of higher education and financed fellowships for children of the poor and less educated parents.
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1.

Introduction
In the last two decades, many countries in Africa have had difficulty extending primary and

secondary schooling to an increasing fraction of their youth, or in building high quality university
training and parallel research institutions. Opinion is divided on how to refocus resources and
determine priorities to improve the prospects for the future.

This paper reviews some of the

economic arguments for specific policies and examines empirical evidence that can be assembled
from household surveys which may help assess the claims and counter-claims advanced for various
proposals.
If “public good aspects” of human capital and positive social externalities of human capital
are an important justification for public investments in education, have we empirically documented
the magnitude of such social benefits to calibrate how public resource priorities should be influenced
by these externalities? The justification of public expenditures on human capital requires not only
that these investments earn a satisfactory overall social return (private returns plus net public
spillovers), it also requires that the distribution of these social returns across individuals and groups
in the society is equitable or narrows existing inequalities in society.
Education is sufficiently valued by most of the world’s elite socioeconomic classes that these
influential groups consume a disproportionate share of public sector resources in education,
especially in higher education. What are the options for improving the personal distribution of
benefits from public expenditures on education, and are there “best practices” which might be
replicated in Africa to channel more of the benefits of education to the children of the poor? Can
poor societies manage to achieve a more equitable access to higher education by quotas, targeted
subsidies, scholarships, or student loans? Has the effort to reduce the educational gap between men
and women been successful? How does the globalization of trade and capital markets, along with the
decreasing cost of immigration, particularly for educated workers, change the landscape and modify
the maneuverability of national educational policy in Africa and other regions where incomes are on
average low?
I will focus mainly on the two salient economic criteria for performance of public policy, that
of efficiency or increasing outputs for a given level of public and private costs of inputs, and of
equity or increasing the share of the private net benefit (in excess of the private costs) received by the
poorer strata of society. The poorer social strata include typically those families residing in rural
areas and remote towns, and children born into families in which economic resources are least
adequate, and to parents who are themselves the least educated in their birth cohort. The political

1

institutions needed to achieve a more efficient and equitable educational system in Africa are likely
to be paramount. But this paper, unfortunately, discusses only a few of the economic considerations.
2.

Schooling, Wages and Educational Priorities
The criteria by which to set priorities in education involve both the tradeoffs between

efficiency and equity, and also the evaluation of the costs and benefits of education to the private
individual and to the broader society. Since the 1960s differences in wages between workers with
different amounts of schooling have been viewed as private productive benefits from attending
school, as represented in Table 1, cell 1A.1 Private costs of schooling are deducted from the benefits
associated with wage differentials, properly discounting both costs and benefits to some initial
decision point when the child may enroll in school. About half of the private costs of attending
school is the productive value of the time that students spend traveling to school, in class and in
studies, which their families forego if their children attend school (Table 1, 1B). Thus, even when
schooling is provided by the state without charge, much of the total costs of schooling remain a
private burden on the family. To enroll their children in school the family must value the gains their
children are likely to receive from their schooling over their adult lifetimes, and the parents must be
willing to reallocate their resources to make these schooling investments, and possibly borrow to
make these investments which appear likely to enhance their children’s future productivity.
Mincer (1974) proposed a rough approximation for the financial private returns to education
which can be readily estimated from a cross-sectional sample. Hundreds of household surveys from
all regions of the world have been examined using his specification of the wage structure for both
men and women.2
Estimates of private returns to schooling (Table 1, 1C) are inevitably compared with returns
to durable physical capital investments, such as might be earned on industrial bonds. There are
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The differences in worker productivity by schooling, age, and sex were first used by T. W. Schultz (1961),
Denison (1962), and Kuznets (1966) to attribute part of modern economic growth to the changing composition
of the labor force in the United States and other countries. The conceptual and empirical analysis of the US
1940 Census cross tabulations of earnings led Becker (1964) to his calculation of an internal rate of return,
which would over an individual’s lifetime equate the opportunity cost of obtaining schooling to the discounted
value of lifetime wage gains. Jorgenson (1995) has continued to extend this approach in his national income
accounts for the United States.
2

Although there are additional questions to resolve in the study of women’s wage structures with these
empirical methods, the estimated wage returns to schooling for women are approximately equivalent to those
for men, with occasionally the private wage returns being higher for women than men in those economies
where women have not attained equal levels of schooling to men (Schultz, 1995). A major challenge is to deal
with the potential bias introduced by the selection of the subsample of the population who work for a wage,
and the selection process determining who receives more and less schooling.
2

nonetheless many differences between human capital and financial assets, notably the lack of
liquidity or marketability of human capital that alters its use as collateral. In addition many students
undoubtedly enjoy being educated and their parents are happy to educate them, and these
consumption and status benefits are expected to also boost their private demands for schooling in
addition to the effects of productive benefits (Table 1, 1A).
From society’s viewpoint, moreover, the educational system requires public resources to
build and maintain school structures, pay teacher salaries, purchase school supplies, and meet
administrative expenses. The public sector may offset some of these educational outlays with school
and examination fees, local taxes earmarked for education, and may recover in the future incremental
taxes paid by students (Table 1, 2B). These taxes may increase with rising education, because better
educated workers tend to allocate more of their time to work to “covered” jobs from which the
government can deduct taxes, and because better educated workers are paid more per hour worked.
However, governments in low income countries tend to collect a relatively small share of their
revenues from personal income, wage, or consumption taxes (e.g. VAT), and hence do not in fact
recover much of the costs of public education from such taxes (Burgess, 1997).
The social return to schooling is generally calculated by adding these public account costs
and revenues associated with schooling (2C) to the private costs and wage returns (1C) on which
Mincer’s private wage return formulation is based. The resulting social returns to schooling (3C),
neglecting initially the elusive social spillovers (3A) which are discussed later, tend to be lower than
the private wage return as approximated by Mincer. Although public costs per student tend to be
slightly larger for higher education than for primary and secondary education in high-income
countries, the public costs for higher education in low-income countries can be 10 and 40 times
larger than those for secondary and primary schools, respectively (Psacharapoulos and Woodhall,
1985). Thus the gap between private and social returns tend to be larger for higher education in low
income countries.
Benefits of schooling, which accrue to individuals other than the student and her family, are
called social spillovers or positive social externalities of schooling (2A). If the present discounted
value of these social benefits of schooling exceeds public net expenditures on producing the
schooling, the public sector receives a positive return on its outlays in the education sector (2C). If
this public sector return exceeds the social cost of capital, or the burden of raising these revenues by
taxation or foregoing other public programs, increased public outlays for the support of this form of
schooling are justified on efficiency grounds alone. Some “market failure” may prevent families
from privately investing the optimal amount in schooling, given the prevailing private return (1C).
3

One possible market failure is that the student/family has imperfect information about the private
returns to school enrollment and underestimate these returns, or the student/family may be unable to
borrow to finance school attendance perhaps because they lack collateral. The poor are believed to
be especially constrained in access to such credit, because human capital cannot generally be used as
collateral by lending institutions or money-lenders. Public subsidies for education are less equally
distributed at the level of higher education than they are at the primary and secondary education
levels (Jimenez, 1987; Hinchliffe, 1993; Colclough, 1997; King, 1997; Tilak, 1997). Thus, high
returns may strengthen an efficiency argument for public investment in higher education, but special
policy instruments are then needed to avoid the consequence of increasing inequality in the personal
distribution of income, if a disproportionate share of the benefits of higher education flows to the
rich.
This human capital framework for analyzing education indicates that the design of
educational policy should take into account both the private demand for schooling and the public
supply of schooling. If the private returns to schooling are low (3C), and families do not demand
more schooling for their children, an expansion of public expenditures on education may not increase
enrollment, and building new schools is not a solution. The public coordination of supply must
monitor the private demand, not only to forecast school utilization rates, but also to anticipate the
private and social returns which can be expected for those individuals who are educated, and to
forecast how enrollments are distributed across different socioeconomic groups in society.
3.

Social Externalities of Schooling
It is widely observed that education is desired by families and by society for reasons other

than simply its capacity to raise worker productivity. Human capital admittedly offers only a limited
perspective on education, although one that can be quantified and monitored in the labor market over
time, and contrasted between different levels of schooling and for different groups whose
membership is fixed in the population. There are also many who see education as a merit good,
defined as a good which all people deserve to receive.

Nonetheless, setting social priorities is

inescapable: How much and what kind of schooling should a country produce, given its available
resources?
Social externalities from education are benefits not realized in terms of private human capital
or consumption benefits accrued by those who make the sacrifices to obtain the education, nor are
they realized in increased output and profits by firms which employ the more educated worker. They
are hypothesized to account for “endogenous growth” which can coexist with competitive markets
and increasing returns (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988).
4

However, few studies have succeeded in

empirically estimating these social external benefits of education, or even suggesting the context in
which they are expected to be most salient, e.g. at the level of the nation state, city, or local
community, or across certain segments of the labor force in a geographic market area.
Particular types of scientific education and allied research and development activities have
been linked to the generation of social external benefits, because they produce productive knowledge
which may diffuse relatively freely in society, and would therefore not be produced in sufficient
amounts if left to private market incentives alone to encourage profitable production. Agricultural
sciences and biotechnology develop new inputs for the farmer, such as high yielding varieties of
crops and livestock, which raise outputs and reduce production costs and eventually reduce the price
of agricultural commodities for the consumer. But these new agricultural inputs are often narrowly
adapted to a specific latitude (i.e., length of day), climate, and local pests. For similar reasons, public
health research may contribute to the improved design of local policy interventions which control
endemic and epidemic diseases by intervening with tailor-made technologies and delivery systems.
These public health inventions have their greatest effectiveness in a specific climate, where certain
parasites are present, and where the population density and sanitation system has certain
characteristics.

Consequently, locally adapted control interventions guided by local policy

evaluation studies are often valuable, which can be most cost-effective when they are coordinated
through public health and medical training and research institutions.
The best documented examples of social externalities associated with schooling involve the
link between the education of parents and home production, which primarily enhance the well being
of family members, and primarily in the formation of human capital in children. Micro-empirical
studies of child development find that increases in the schooling of the mother are associated with
improvements in child developmental outcomes, and these effects tend to be larger than those
associated with the same increases in the years of schooling of the father. The larger effects of the
mother’s schooling than the father’s schooling are commonly observed whether the child
development indicator is birth-weight, child survival, nutritional status as measured by height or
weight-for-height given age, age of entry into school, school enrollment adjusted for age, or years of
schooling completed upon reaching adulthood (Schultz, 2002).3
3

These human capital inter-

Unfortunately many empirical studies of the effect of parent schooling on child development are flawed
from the perspective of this analysis, because they control for variables that are themselves likely to be
affected by parent schooling. A deeper understanding of the marriage market might sharpen our insights into
some of these connections and how gender differences in parent schooling contribute to child development.
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generational externalities of schooling favor social investments in women’s schooling, but most of
these studies have concentrated on the effects of primary and secondary education.
4.

Are Wage Differences by Education a Misleading Indicator of Productivity?
According to some observers the current structure of wage rates by schooling, age, and sex in

a low-income country does not represent an accurate picture of the productive gains that would be
realized by increasing the supply of better-educated persons. For example, an analysis of Côte
d’Ivoire reports earnings differentials which imply each year of schooling of a worker is associated
with him or her receiving on average a 23 percent increment in earnings, after holding constant for
other characteristics of the worker and the sector in which the worker is employed: formal/informal,
government, public enterprise, or private firm.

The authors conclude their discussion of their

estimated “wage function” by attributing the high private rate of return to schooling to imperfections
in the labor market. They caution that it is “reasonable to link this result to rigidity in salary scales.”
And without offering further evidence, the authors conclude that “there is probably considerable
room for reduction in wages and salaries throughout the modern labor market that would make wages
and salaries more competitive” (Berthelemy and Bourguignon, 1996, p.48).

No description is

provided of an empirical test for market wage “rigidity”, or how they propose to achieve a “reduction
in wages and salaries throughout the modern labor market”. The assumption that labor markets in
low-income countries are seriously distorted (i.e., by unions, governments, and monopsonistic firms)
has a long and influential history in development economics from Lewis (1954), to Fei and Ranis
(1964), and Harris and Todaro (1970), but one that is rarely submitted to empirical testing. 4
From the perspective of university administrators and personnel, the benefits of having more
graduates of higher education in low-income countries extend well beyond the productive earning
capacity of those who receive the higher education. The Task Force on Higher Education and Society
(World Bank, 2000) argues that “Rate-of-return studies treat educated people as valuable only
through their higher earnings and the greater tax revenues extracted by society. But educated people

4

Easterly (2001) summarizes the evidence from cross country regressions of growth on changes in
educational attainment, which do not always find a positive partial correlation, which is viewed as challenging
the idea that education contributes to growth. Anomalous estimates of cross country growth rates over time
conditioned on changes over time in education may be partly explained by measurement error. Topel (1999)
examines the specifications of some of these aggregate growth regressions and interprets the meaning of the
empirical evidence in light of wage function estimates.
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clearly have many other effects on society: educated people are well-positioned to be economic and
social entrepreneurs, having far reaching impact on the economic and social well-being of their
communities. They are also vital to creating an environment in which economic development is
possible. Good governance, strong institutions, and a developed infrastructure are all needed if
business is to thrive -- and none of these is possible without highly educated people. Finally, rate-ofreturn analysis entirely misses the impact of university-based research on the economy -- a farreaching social benefit that is at the heart of any argument for developing strong higher educational
systems” (World Bank, 2000, p.39). Unfortunately the Report does not offer quantitative evidence
and analysis to support its conjectures. Household and labor force survey data in Africa in the last
decade have been much improved, and the emerging wage patterns they reveal have significant
implications for educational priorities.
5.

Household Survey Estimates of Wage Returns to Schooling
A growing number of low-income countries, including many in Africa, administer surveys to

random samples of households, which include standard modules on education, wages, earnings, and
other socioeconomic characteristics. These data can be used to estimate the productivity of different
groups of workers in the wage labor force and suggest whose children are becoming better educated.
These data quantify private investment incentives for expanding different levels of education and for
targeting schooling to specific groups in the population. The next step is combining wage benefits of
schooling and information on public costs of schooling to approximate social returns. The basic
scientific methods for appraising the social externalities from education are not yet in hand.
To assess the limitations of estimated wage functions, which might lead them to be biased or
misleading for policy purposes, economic and statistical studies have analyzed household labor force
surveys for several decades, and studied specialized samples to control for genetic potential, such as
those of identical twins (Schultz, 1988; Card, 1999, 2001). Although this field of research is focused
on wage structures in high-income countries, and notably the United States, the underlying issues of
statistical bias and measurement error do not seem fundamentally different in the form which they
take in low- and high-income countries. Therefore, the methodological and empirical findings from
this extensive literature appear relevant to an assessment of the evidence reported in this paper for
Africa.
Surveys of the estimates of the returns to schooling provide many references (e.g.
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002; Appleton, 2000), but they generally do not critically distinguish
the comparability of various empirical estimates of returns, or the criteria for accepting the validity of
an estimate. Specifically, estimates of firm production functions have occupied much attention in
7

econometrics, but appear incapable of delivering precise estimates of human capital returns,
compared with estimates of individual wage functions for different fixed groups ( i.e. defined by
ethnicity or sex) (Mincer, 1974). This does not imply, however, that all wage functions are equally
informative, because if they are conditioned on endogenous characteristics of the worker’s
employment, such as job tenure, occupation, or industry, or on the worker’s simultaneous behavior,
such as hours worked, migration, or fertility, the estimated effects of schooling they report are likely
to be biased from the true private wage return (Schultz, 1988).
In the estimation of production functions at the individual firm or farm level, or at the
aggregate level of industries or states, it was recognized in the 1950s that it was important to allow
for the variation in the quality of labor in order to understand cross-sectional differences in outputs,
or changes over time represented in growth accounting (Griliches, 1970; Jorgenson, 1995).
Experimentation with alternative specifications of labor quality, and estimation of flexible forms of
production functions, confirmed that years of educational attainment of workers was a reasonable
first-approximation for productive “labor quality”(Griliches, 1970). But further refinements have not
followed by explicit disaggregation of the labor input into a substantial number of education, age,
and sex groups, from which the marginal productivity of different forms of human capital could be
confidently inferred. Heterogeneous labor inputs were instead aggregated into efficiency units of
“quality adjusted” labor, weighted usually by group wage differentials, and augmented by ad hoc
shifters for the proportion of the labor force who were women or in skilled occupations. Perhaps
production functions methods could not recover more specifically the labor productivity of
heterogeneous workers because of the statistical collinearity among the various productive types of
workers, or due to the bias introduced by the endogenous allocation of different (labor) inputs in
response to unobserved management ability and technological change. It is not surprising, therefore,
that estimates of production functions for firms which employ predominantly nonfamily labor have
not contributed importantly to our understanding of the marginal productivity of human capital, or
specifically to the rates of return to schooling.
However, better educated farmers or farm managers are observed to be more productive, both
because they can produce more in a static setting, and because they enhance the allocative efficiency
of production in an dynamic environment where technology and relative prices are changing (Welch,
1970; T.W. Schultz, 1975; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995). But even at the level of the family farm,
conventional quality adjustments of labor inputs do not adequately capture how heterogeneous
family labor affects farm and off-farm family production possibilities.

8

Other forms of bias may be introduced into the estimation of individual wage functions, if
they are estimated from a sample of workers drawn from a single occupation, a sector, or type of
firm, which is therefore unrepresentative of the entire population who could be educated, or if the
wage function includes as an additional explanatory variable characteristics of the job and employer,
which reveal the endogenous quality of the match between worker and job, that depends on
unobservables that are correlated with schooling. Employment in a selective formal sector, such as
manufacturing firms in Africa, cannot be expected to yield a representative sample of workers, and
consequently the observed wage gains associated with schooling conditional on being in such a
selective sample are likely to bias downward.5 No procedure has been proposed or implemented to
correct for this potentially serious bias when reporting manufacturing firm-based estimates of
schooling returns (Bigsten, et al. 2000).

Nonetheless, across six African countries such

manufacturing wage returns tend to increase with the level of schooling, from 2 to 7 percent at the
primary school level, to 7-19 percent at the secondary level, and from 21 to 31 percent at the postsecondary level. In addition, these estimates treat job tenure as though it is exogenous, whereas
tenure should be treated as endogenous, as shown by Altonji and Shakotko (1987), among others.
Wage differences between workers with various amounts and types of schooling provide a
starting point for those who seek policy insights into the private wage returns to schooling. These
estimates may then need to be adjusted to take account of social costs and benefits and additional
sources of bias. The most salient concern with these direct measures of wage returns to schooling is
that other determinants of the wage have not been adequately taken into account, and these “omitted
factors” may themselves be plausibly correlated with schooling.

Consequently, some of the

influence of the omitted factor on wages will be spuriously attributed to schooling. These omitted
factors could be related to the productive capacity of the individual worker (such as ability, health,
mobility, preferences) or to the process sorting individuals into better paying jobs (i.e., family
connections, ethnicity, other market imperfections, such as the political allocation of jobs in public
enterprises and in the government’s civil service).
There is no entirely satisfactory way to deal with the bias potentially introduced by all such
omitted variables, but two empirical strategies warrant discussion. Either the social statistician
5

For example, suppose that unobserved worker ability or motivation is positively related to schooling and to
obtaining a (good) job in manufacturing, conditional on schooling. Consequently, the error in the wage
function, and the error in the sample selection (or job tenure) equation, will tend to be positively correlated,
imparting a downward bias to the estimated effect of schooling on wages, unless the estimates of the wage
function are corrected for this selection bias (Heckman., 1979).

9

attempts to measure the omitted factor and includes it while estimating the wage function, and
thereby focuses on the partial association with schooling, conditional on the control variables, or an
“instrumental variable” is specified that is associated with schooling but is plausibly assumed to be
uncorrelated with the omitted variable.6 The original motivation of this literature was to correct for
the omitted “ability” and “family socioeconomic status” of the worker which were expected to
overstate the wage function returns to schooling. But these expectations have not been confirmed
with any consistency by the extensive empirical literature. The first generation of evidence concluded
that the magnitude of this total bias in estimated returns was small, probably because the “omitted
variable” upward bias was offset by “errors in the measurement” of education, which would bias
downward the ordinary least squares estimate of the private wage return to schooling (Card, 1999,
2001).
For example, in the 1970s a school building program in Indonesia focused on the poorer rural
areas of the country, which led to substantial increases in educational attainments for persons of
school age residing in regions when the new schools were built. These potential beneficiaries of the
school building program were observed to be both better educated and better paid when observed in
the labor force in the 1990s. The added program expenditure on schools in a region is used by Duflo
(2001) as an instrumental variable to explain the added earnings of workers from different regions
(i.e. covariance of program expenditures and wages divided by the variance in wages) and which
implicitly embodies the intermediate variable of school attainment of the workers (i.e. covariance of
program expenditures and schooling divided by the variance in schooling). If these estimates of the
program on wages are divided by the estimate of the program effect on schooling, one obtains the
instrumental variable (IV) estimate of how much a year of schooling increases a worker’s wage.
This IV estimate of the private return to schooling is approximately the same as obtained when
schooling’s effect on wages is estimated using Mincer’s direct specification (i.e. covariance of wages
and schooling divided by the variance in wages). This school building program shifted outward the
supply of schooling, and various specification checks performed by Duflo (2001) confirm that this

6

Schooling is mapped onto the instrumental variable in a first-stage analysis, and then this prediction of
schooling based on the instrument is used to explain wages in a second-stage analysis, which under specified
conditions will be corrected for omitted variable bias and for classical sources of measurement error embodied
in the survey variable measuring schooling (Card, 1999). A study of East Africa attempted to hold a worker’s
achievement score on a standardized test constant, and then evaluate the remaining relationship between
schooling and wages (Boissiere, et al, 1985).
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program instrument was not correlated with other factors affecting a worker’s wage, such as ability,
or other social welfare programs, such as those improving sanitation.
Wage patterns in six African countries from 1985 to 1999 are reported in the next section of
this paper to assess educational returns. It is ironic that world leaders of higher education are
reluctant to consider wage structures for policy purposes (World Bank, 2000), because they think that
wage returns to higher education are low. But in these African countries returns to education are
substantial, and possibly higher for the young than the old, and higher for those with some postsecondary education. Conversely, other studies document large returns to schooling (e.g. Berthelmey
and Bourguignon, 1996) and conclude they are evidence of distorted labor markets and dismiss them
as a guide for setting educational priorities.
6.

Wage Differentials by Education in Six African Countries
Ghana has experienced long swings in its educational investments and economic growth and

has released four similar surveys in the last decade. Some features of Ghana can be compared with
those prevailing in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, and to Kenya in East Africa.7 Estimates from South
Africa are reported by racial groups, which suggests how political restrictions on the supply of
education to Africans can raise wage returns. In conclusion, I review new estimates of wage returns
to schooling for Nigeria and Burkina Faso, based on a parallel specification of the individual wage
function.
Ghana experienced a difficult economic period following its independence in 1957.8
Economic growth only stayed up with population growth during the first decade, and from 1965 to
1985 real GDP declined. By contrast, Kenya in this period sustained a growth in per capita GDP of 2
percent per year, while Côte d’Ivoire grew initially at the same rate as its population, and then
7

Other studies of the wage structure in Kenya and the consequences of the divergent paths taken by the
educational systems in Kenya and Tanzania relied on data from the 1970s, and often generalized from surveys
of manufacturing firms for whom wage workers may not be particularly representative (Knight and Sabot,
1981,1990). The Living Standard Survey of Tanzania collected in 1993 did not include hourly wage data for
individuals.
8

In 1957 Ghana and Korea were reckoned to have approximately the same income per capita, comparing
local currency GNP by means of foreign exchange rates. Ghana had the highest income level in West Africa at
that time, but experienced an economic growth rate thereafter, which was only slightly more rapid than its
population growth during the next 25 years. In contrast, Korea grew much faster in the 1960s and thereafter
until the financial crisis of 1997 when its income level per capita was about ten-fold greater than Ghana.
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accelerated until the 1980s (World Bank, 1986). By the end of the 1980s, Ghana began to revive,
whereas Côte d’Ivoire stagnated, and Kenya expanded rapidly. But in the 1990's the order has
reversed; Kenya slowed to an annual growth rate of 2.2 percent, Côte d’Ivoire grew at 3.7 percent,
and Ghana at 4.3 percent (World Bank, 2001). Ghana started in the 1950s with wider provision of
primary education, while Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya invested more heavily in their public educational
system, and caught up to Ghana. Against the backdrop of economic growth and decline in these
countries, household surveys can suggest how current wage structures reward those who have
acquired more and less schooling.
The average number of years of schooling completed for men and women is plotted as a
smoothed five-year moving average by the individual’s age in Figures 1 through 6 for Ghana in
1987, Cote d’Ivoire in 1985, Kenya in 1994, South Africa in 1993, Nigeria in 1996-99, and Burkina
Faso in 1994, respectively.
In Figure 1 men in Ghana who are age 40 in 1987 (or born in 1947) had attained nearly 8
years of schooling on average, whereas women of the same age had only half as many years of
schooling. Men who are age 65 had only 3 years of schooling and women less than 1 year. The lack
of growth in educational attainment among younger cohorts in Ghana who were born after 1950
could conceal more recent improvements in average educational levels, if some of the youngest
respondents are still in school, and if emigration from Ghana was more likely among the better
educated younger birth cohorts. In Ghana the share of GNP devoted to public education was 3.1
percent in 1980, and had increased to 4.7 percent by 1997.
A nationally representative household Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS) was collected
in 1987/88, 1988/89, and 1991/92 and 1998/99.9 Table 2 reports the regression coefficients from
each survey where the log of the hourly wage is regressed on the different educational attainment
categories for persons age 25 to 54, including as explanatory variables the potential years of postschooling experience and its square and whether the individual resided in a rural area. The
educational category excluded from the regression includes persons with no schooling. In 1987, 31
percent of the men had no schooling, and by 1998 only 20 percent were without any formal
schooling. Similarly, in 1987, 55 percent of women had not received any school, and this share
9

The GLSS retained a similar questionnaire and comparable sampling methods in the four rounds,
although the World Bank participated in the initial two years, and the educational attainment question changed
in the last year to emphasize certificates and degrees received rather than the years of schooling completed by
level.
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declined to 40 percent in 1998. Relatively few individuals obtained only a secondary school
certificate and did not continue to obtain some post-secondary schooling. University degrees are
rare, but including also teacher/nurse/technical certificates from post-secondary institutions, the
fraction of the population age 25-54 with any higher educational degree is 6.8 percent for males in
1987 and 8.8 percent in 1998, whereas for females the share has remained roughly constant at 2.8
percent.
The private wage returns per year of schooling are estimated in the bottom panels of Table 2,
between pairs of educational categories.10 Enrollment from primary to middle school yields modest
returns, averaging about 4 percent (log points) per year in this period, whereas returns from middle to
secondary school are larger, averaging about 11 percent. University four-year degrees earn a return
over secondary certificates which averages about 16 percent, but these estimates vary substantially
from year to year, probably due to sampling variability given the small number of university
graduates observed in the sample in any single survey. The nurse/teacher certificates appear to be
well rewarded for a two- or three-year course of study. The inability to assign a particular number of
years of study to the heterogeneous degrees called “commercial and vocational” precludes drawing
any firm conclusions regarding the estimates of the returns to these varied educational programs,
some of which may require of an entering student only a primary school certificate.
Table 3 reports the same specification for the wage function for the first and last year of the
Ghana surveys, but the sample is now disaggregated into two age groups to assess how returns are
changing over time across birth cohorts. The estimates for returns to university training and postsecondary training tend to be larger for the younger birth cohort than the older birth cohort,
suggesting that the balance of the supply versus the demand for better educated workers is becoming
more favorable for these younger better-educated workers in Ghana.
In Côte d’Ivoire the expansion of primary and secondary schooling has occurred more
recently in the midst of a period of strong economic growth (Figure 2). Cote d’Ivoire spent the
largest share of its income on public education in 1980 or 7.2 percent, but this share had fallen by

10

The difference between the log wages for persons in two educational categories in Table 2 is inferred from
the difference in the regression coefficients (e.g. in 1987 men with secondary school certificate compared with
those with middle school certificates, or 1.135 - .574= .561), which is divided by the number of years of
schooling separating the two groups (i.e. 5 years), to obtain the .11 log point private wage return per year of
schooling, which is multiplied by 100 to approximate the percentage return to secondary school in Table 2,
column 2, next to the bottom row.
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1997 to 5.0 percent (World Bank, 2001). As shown in Table 4, the Cote d’Ivoire Living Standard
Surveys of 1985/86 and 1986/87 indicate the private wage returns for primary and middle school are
roughly 10-12 percent, or somewhat higher than in Ghana. This difference between neighboring
countries might be due to the smaller supply of primary graduates in Côte d’Ivoire, or the more rapid
national growth of its economy. The returns of secondary over middle school is associated with high
returns, 12 to 28 percent, while at the University level returns fluctuate around 10-15 percent. In
Côte d’Ivoire the returns beyond secondary school for the younger sample age 25-34 tend to be
higher than the returns received by the older sub-sample.
Kenya became independent in 1963 and grew relatively rapidly until the last decade. The
expansion of the public school system absorbed 6.5 percent of Kenya’s GNP since about 1980, while
private and locally funded secondary schools were another avenue to education in Kenya (World
Bank, 2001: p.284; Knight and Sabot, 1990). Estimates of wage functions for Kenya (Table 5) are
based on the 1994 Welfare Monitoring Survey II. Wage returns are on the order of 9 percent at the
middle school level, and they tend to increase for women at secondary level. At the university level
the returns are high, and appear to be larger for women than men. The estimated returns are higher
for the younger than older cohorts, with the exception of males at the secondary level, suggesting that
the supply of primary and post-secondary trained workers has not caught up to the derived demand
by 1994. Perhaps in response to the higher returns to women than to men at the secondary and
higher educational levels, women in Kenya by 1994 are closing the gender gap in education, and
have today attained on average almost as many years of schooling as men.

Among earlier

generations of Kenyans, age 50-54, women had only a third as many years of schooling as men
(Figure 3). This rapid advance in female education relative to male has contributed to the increased
rate of migration of women from rural to urban areas, and to the unusually sharp decline in Kenyan
child mortality and fertility and population growth.
In 1993 a Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development collected representative
household survey data for South Africa from which Figure 4 is derived. More than three-quarters of
the population age 16-65 is black African, 8 percent is of mixed race or “colored,” 3 percent is of
Asian descent, and 14 percent is white. Table 6 reports the log wage function coefficients, stratified
for the two largest groups, Africans and whites. The levels of schooling and wage returns to
schooling for the two smaller racial groups are intermediate between those for Africans and whites
(Mwabu and Schultz, 2000). The implied private wage returns to higher education are nearly twice
as high for Africans as they are for whites, and returns are higher at the post-secondary school level
than at the primary or secondary school levels for both race groups and genders.
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One simple explanation for the high returns to secondary and post-secondary education for
Africans is that the supply of Africans who have attained these levels of education has been restricted
or politically rationed by the previous Apartheid government. For example, two percent of African
men age 45 to 65 had any higher education, and 5 percent of African women. Even among the
youngest age group, 16 to 29, the fraction of African men and women with any higher education was
5 and 12 percent, respectively. In contrast, 34 percent of white men and 25 percent of white women
age 45 to 65 had some higher education, with the fraction increasing somewhat among younger
whites. The roughly ten times larger proportion of whites than Africans with higher education is one
factor lowering the returns to higher education among the whites compared with the Africans.
African wage returns are also higher for the younger groups, suggesting that the imbalance between
supply and derived demand was increasing in the last years of the Apartheid regime. The political
rationing of advancement of Africans into the higher education system generated both an inequitable
distribution of schooling (Figure 4), but also an inefficient allocation of resources from a perspective
of maximizing average private returns. This pattern of returns underscores the economic need in
South Africa to expand access to higher education for non-whites who were previously inefficiently
and inequitably rationed out of the school system, as well as to merge and equalize the quality or
public resources spent per student, regardless of race.
A recent analysis of the Nigerian General Household Survey (GHS) from 1996 to 1999
provides parallel estimates of wage returns to schooling for Nigeria (Aromolaran, 2002). Table 7
reports spline (piece-wise linear) estimates of the private hourly wage returns to primary, secondary,
and post-secondary schooling for men and women age 15 to 64, also disaggregated into three age
groups. In Nigeria the average schooling attained, as reported in this survey sample, increased from
3.07 years for males age 45-64, to 5.75 years for males 25-34, while schooling for females has
increased from 1.65 years at age 45-64 to 3.41 years of schooling for age 25-34 (Figure 5). Among
wage earners, hourly wage rates increase by about 2.5 and 2.4 percent for each year of primary
school, by about 3.9 and 4.4 percent for each year of secondary school, and by 10 and 12 percent per
year of post-secondary schooling, for men and women, respectively.11

11

Only about nine percent of Nigerian men work for a wage or salary, whereas among women only
about three percent are wage earners. Whether the wage structure approximates satisfactorily the
productivity of labor in self-employment and family production activities, in which most Nigerians
work, is not known. Correcting for the nonrandom process selecting the sample of wage earners may
modify the estimated returns of men and women, even though it does not seem to impart a
predictable or substantial source of bias in a other studies of low income countries (Schultz, 1995).
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Comparing wage returns across birth cohorts, the primary school returns are higher among
the older birth cohorts for whom primary schooling was much less common than today, whereas the
returns to secondary school are roughly constant across birth cohorts for males, but returns are larger
among the younger women age 25-34 than among older women. At the post-secondary school level,
returns tend to be higher among the younger cohorts. These estimates for Nigeria suggest a pattern
in schooling returns broadly similar to that found in Ghana, where the private wage returns are low at
the primary level, and substantial at the post-secondary school level. The absolute gap in years of
education between men and women in Nigeria has been relatively stable across age cohorts (Figure 5
and Table 7) in contrast with Kenya where the gender gap has closed.
Finally, trends in educational attainment for Burkina Faso are estimated from a Priority
Survey (PS) which is plotted from 1994 in Figure 6. Burkina has the lowest level of income per
capita of the countries considered here, and schooling attainment is also the lowest. Among men age
55-59 the mean years of schooling completed is about 0.6 years, and this has increased to 2.4 years in
the youngest group, aged 30. Women in Burkina who are age 30 have about half of the schooling of
men, or 1.2 years on average, and although female/male fraction was even lower in the past
(Kazianga, 2002).
Table 8 reports spline estimates of the primary, secondary and post-secondary schooling
private monthly wage returns for men and women age 15 to 65 in Burkina Faso, as inferred from the
1994 and 1998 PS surveys.

A year of primary schooling is associated with male monthly wages

being 12 percent (log points) higher in 1994 and 9.3 percent higher in 1998, whereas for women
these returns are 18 and 16 percent, respectively. At the secondary school level, men’s wage returns
are higher at 22 and 17 percent in 1994 and 1998, whereas for women they are 22 and 26 percent,
respectively. Post-secondary schooling, though uncommon, is significantly associated with 16 and
18 percent returns for men in 1994 and 1998, and with 18 and 13 percent for women, under the
working assumption that persons reporting some post-secondary schooling have completed two years
of study. Returns are substantial at all schooling levels and higher at the secondary than at the
primary level. The percentage wage gains reported per year of schooling completed are generally
higher for women than for men in Burkina, although the level of women’s wages are lower than
men’s as they are in all of the other countries, holding their years of education and post-schooling
experience constant (Kazianga, 2002).

Empirical Regularities in Schooling Returns Across Six African Countries
Becker (1964) first noted the empirical tendency for the private internal rates of return to
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education in the United States to decrease at higher levels of education, and this tendency has been
frequently discussed as though it is a universal feature of studies of wage returns to education in
other countries (Psacharapolos and Woodhall, 1985; Psacharapolos and Patrinos, 2002).12 Yet there
is nothing in the human capital framework which prescribes this pattern; returns will vary according
to supply and demand conditions in the market. Returns to higher education are likely to increase
when the supply of better educated workers grows more slowly than the derived demands, due
perhaps to skill-biased technical change, specific forms of institutional change (e.g. decline in union
membership), or changes in the openness of an economy to international trade and competition
(Acemoglu, 2002). The time required for public and private investments in education to expand (or
contract) the supply of workers with a specific educational attainment could be a decade or longer,
allowing for the emergence of such “disequilibria” or “rents” paid to workers who did not necessarily
expect these rents when they made their educational investments.
A preoccupation of economists in the 1990s has been to explain the increase in the wage
returns to college-educated workers in the United States (Murphy and Welch, 1992; Katz and Autor,
1999; Acemoglu, 2002). But this pattern of rising returns for post-secondary schooling is now
reported in a growing number of middle- and low-income countries, such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and Thailand, and China (Topel, 1999; Schultz, 2000). The
evidence from recent representative surveys in Africa, which was presented below in section 6,
confirms the same regularity, and should be taken into account by policy makers as they consider
educational priorities in Africa.13
If private returns to schooling increase at more advanced levels of education, poorer families
who are on average educating their children at the primary school level will face low returns, while
richer families who are on average educating their children to secondary or post-secondary school
level face much higher returns. Thus, all families may invest efficiently in their children’s human
capital to maximize their family’s wealth, and not be subject to borrowing constraints, and yet the

12

Becker (1964; p.127) concluded from his analysis of U.S.1940 census data that private returns for white
males were about 18 percent in high school (secondary), but declined to about 10 percent at college level. In
the second edition of his Human Capital he includes a discussion of mechanisms (i.e. ability of student and
borrowing costs) which would allow the family supply of investments in schooling of their children to differ,
despite the hypothesized diminishing returns to schooling reflected in the derived demands for workers with
different levels of schooling (1975: 94-144). Having the returns to schooling increase with higher levels of
schooling adds an additional factor contributing to inequality in schooling investments across individuals.
13

Note the same pattern in returns is observed within the Manufacturing sectors in six African countries reported by
Bigsten, et al.(2000), although the specifications adopted in this study is not comparable to the one adopted in this study.
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poor are motivated to invest less per child than the rich. Families may also be inclined concentrate
their schooling investments in their most promising children who are more likely to reach a higher
level of education for which the returns are expected to be higher. Inequality in education and
earnings may then more likely to increase overtime both between families and within families, which
differs from the setting described by Becker (1964) in the 1940 US Census in which the marginal
returns to schooling decrease at more advanced levels of schooling.
What policies can help the poor enroll their children in basic schooling until private returns
increase enough to provide them with the incentive to continue marginal investments in more
schooling? The challenge is to design these policies to promote both an efficient composition of
schooling without adding to future inequalities in society.
7.

Who Benefits from Subsidized Education
The distribution of educational opportunity across persons in Africa is currently unequal.

Cross tabulations of information available from the Living Standard Surveys collected in Ghana and
Côte d’Ivoire illustrates this inequality which represents the lack of social mobility across
generations. The surveys ask for the education of the mother and father of all household members. I
consider here how the “likelihood that a person receives some higher education” is associated with
the schooling of his or her parents. The likelihood is calculated for all persons in these surveys, and
thus omits from a birth cohort only those who emigrated or died before the survey. Table 9 shows
that 1.8 percent of the men age 55 or over in Ghana attended some higher education, whereas that
fraction increased more than four fold to 8.8 percent among those aged 35 to 44, and then possibly
declined to 6.7 percent in the youngest age group 25 to 34. Women in Ghana also experienced a large
increase in their higher education, but their likelihood of attending higher education was only about a
quarter that of men. The prominent gender disparity in higher education in many African countries
does not occur in South Africa (Figures 1-6).
Among men in Ghana age 55 and over, those whose father had some secondary schooling
had a 40 percent chance of attending higher education, 22 times the national average, and 33 times
that of a male whose father had not attended school (Table 9). Those older men with a mother who
had some secondary school attended higher education 67 times more frequently than those with a
mother who had no schooling. These indications of substantial inter-generational inequality of
educational immobility diminished for the younger men, as education became more widespread.
Among men age 25 to 34, their likelihood of continuing to higher education was about 4 times
greater for persons with a father with some secondary school than for those with a father who had no
schooling, and 7 time greater if his mother had this relative advantage in her schooling.
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Until the 1970's, the educational system reached a smaller fraction of the population in Côte
d’Ivoire than in Ghana, but thereafter higher education was obtained by nearly twice the share of
males in Côte d’Ivoire as in Ghana, or 11 percent of those age 25-34, while 2.8 percent of females of
this age had obtained any higher education.14

Among men age 45-54, the likelihood of attending

higher education in Côte d’Ivoire is 25 times larger if their father had some secondary schooling than
if his father had no schooling, and 50 times larger if their mother had this same relative educational
attainment. These odds ratios of receiving higher education conditional on a person’s father’s
education declined in Côte d’Ivoire to 3.5 for males age 25-34, and based on his mother’s education
they declined to 7.4
The low level of inter-generational educational mobility reported here is consistent with the
observations of others (Psacharapoulos and Woodhall, 1985; King, 1997; Colclough, 1997; Kimalu.
et al., 2001). Higher education, which is predominantly public in Africa, has absorbed relatively
large public subsidies per student year, often without charging any student fees, and in some cases,
such as Côte d’Ivoire, academically qualifying student are given living stipends, regardless of
financial need. The resulting large public transfers made to students enrolled in higher education
benefit predominantly those families who were relatively well educated in the past. According to the
wage functions reported earlier, these well-educated parents receive, on average, relatively high
wages, and their children will be disproportionately at the top of the income distribution in the next
generation. Without efforts to help the poor qualify for, and to enroll in, higher education, the
maintenance of current policies will contribute to sustaining the substantial economic inequality
present in Africa.
What are the policy alternatives, which might reduce these undesirable distributional
consequences of the current African system of education? The challenge is to find a self-sustaining
source of revenues on which to build an expansion of higher education, while at the same time to
reduce the concentration of “rents” generated by the current system of higher education for the
children of the upper classes.
8. Policies to Improve the Distribution of Public Subsidies for Education

14

These differences between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire may be affected by emigration, and thus may not reflect
accurately the levels of educational attainment achieved by a sequence of birth cohorts in the two countries. It
is likely that a larger fraction of higher educated individuals, especially doctors and engineers, from Ghana left
the country during the 1960s and 1970s when growth was much lower in Ghana than Côte d’Ivoire.
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Changing the personal distribution of benefits of higher education can be accomplished by a
variety of pricing, transfer, and regulatory policies, and perhaps by changing the mix and location of
educational institutions in Africa. Student loans, quotas, and targeted subsidies are all conventional
methods to deal with the distributional problem described here, and they have been tried in different
contexts with mixed success (Albrecht and Ziderman, 1991; Johnstone, 1992; Colclough, 1997;
Tilak, 1997). Which of these approaches hold the greatest promise for Africa?
Given the survey evidence that private wage returns to higher education are substantial, why
do poor families not invest more in the schooling of their children? One hypothesis is that the poor
family and student are credit constrained, at least when they want to invest in human capital, because
human capital does not offer lenders a recoverable form of collateral in case of default, such as land
for the farmer who borrows (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1999). One solution proposed to this problem is
to offer student loans, which the students could repay from their enhanced earnings as adults. A
central student loan facility could hope to monitor the earnings of most workers with a higher
education, since they predominantly work in the modern sector. By pooling large numbers of loans
to students with different abilities, specialties, and working in distinct labor markets, such a facility
should be able to reduce the risk on its overall portfolio and thereby reduce the interest rates it must
charge to self finance loans. This approach was first adopted at some private universities in highincome countries, and then extended nationally by governments to students from relatively poor
families to finance a fraction of the actual costs of higher education. The U.S. government has been
able to require income tax forms to validate parent income and student means of support, and thereby
minimize the opportunities for fraudulent claims of financial need or subsequent default (Nerlove,
1975). Yet evaluations of a variety of student loan programs in low-income countries conclude they
have had serious problems, with sufficiently high default rates to prevent them from becoming self
sustaining, while the cost of administration represents a large fraction of total program costs
(Woodhall, 1992).

Kenya and Venezuela are cited as examples where repayment rates were

sufficiently low that it would have been cheaper for the government to have converted the loans to
outright scholarships (Colclough, 1997; p.77). Moreover, if students with higher education become
highly indebted to a State loan program, this might encourage emigration as a means to escape the
burden of repayment, exacerbating the growing problem of brain drain.

Pressure to institute

restrictions on immigration of higher educated citizens could then follow (Bhagwati and Partington,
1967).
Quotas have been used by India to achieve more representation in higher education by
persons from lower castes and scheduled tribes and to increase the fraction of women in political
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offices (Chattopadhay and Duflo, 2001). Although admission quotas may achieve a redistribution of
the benefits of higher education, they are likely to also create a lower quality of schooling for the
groups assigned minimum quotas.

If the quota is not based on a readily monitored characteristic

such as sex, caste, or race, how would it be administered? Ethnic and language groups might be
identified which had below-average educational attainment, according to a population census or
nationally representative household survey, and individuals from these disadvantaged groups could
then be assigned a compensating upward adjustment in their rankings for fellowships and for
admission into institutions of higher education. Although such a policy might have appeal for its
transparency, it could also have undesirable political consequences in a country where ethnic
conflicts are already a serious source of social friction.
What would constitute a satisfactory index of “economic need” on which to target transfers
in order to redistribute the benefits of higher education? What readily verified information could be
used to direct educational subsidies to the educationally disadvantaged, which would not encourage
counterproductive forms of behavior or misrepresentation? The survey data presented earlier for
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire suggest that parent education would be one such basis for identifying those
differentially represented among those receiving higher education. Awarding an educational subsidy
on the basis of your parent’s educational disadvantage would not discourage productive effect on
effort or labor supply or market earnings, as would means-tested transfer, and would presumably be
easier to administer and monitor by a government auditor than would the current income or wealth of
the parents.
Geographical targeting should also be simpler to administer and in some countries it would
be relatively efficient. The income and education gaps between rural and urban populations are
generally larger in low-income countries than in high-income countries where there is greater labor
mobility. Tables 2 through 6 illustrate that wages are substantially lower in rural areas, even after
controlling for the worker’s schooling, age, and sex: wage rates are between 30 and 43 percent lower
in Ghana; 38 and 75 percent lower in Côte d’Ivoire; 45 to 61 percent lower in Kenya; and 30 to 33
percent lower for Africans in South Africa, but rural residence is not reported in the Nigerian survey,
and this distinction is oddly insignificant in the Burkina Faso survey.
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Per capita household

The coefficient on rural residence in the wage functions reported in Tables 2-6 and 8 is converted to a
wage differential by exponentiating the coefficient and subtracting it from 1.0. This represents how large a
proportion the rural wage is of the urban wage. For example, for Kenyan males age 25-34 the rural wage is 55
percent of the urban, i.e., .55 = exp(-.603) or .45 below urban levels.
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expenditures could be estimated from a national household survey to target scholarships to children
from regions with more widespread poverty.
Between a fourth and a third of the variation in educational attainments across individuals in
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire can be accounted for by a three-variable geographic distinction
(rural/capital city/other urban), parent schooling, and age, as illustrated by the regressions
summarized in Table 10. In Côte d’Ivoire the average education of a men in Abidjan is 4 years
greater than in the rural areas, when the national average for males age 25 to 54 is 3.8 years of
schooling. A man with a father who completed only 8 years of education versus a father with no
schooling is associated with a four years advantage in schooling (i.e., .521 * 8 = 4.2). An educational
subsidy could be targeted to children from (poor) rural areas whose parents have the least education
following a simple estimable relationship as reported in Table 10. These subsidies could be financed
by increasing tuitions for students currently enrolled in public higher education whose parents reside
in urban areas and have above average levels of education. As discussed in the next section,
increased student fees could not only finance the personal redistribution of the benefits of higher
education toward poorer families, it could improve the governance and operation of higher education.
In the last decade, a variety of low-income countries have implemented human capital
incentive programs to encourage household demand for more schooling, and these programs could be
adapted to African circumstances. Bangladesh introduced a secondary school scholarship program
for girls, which placed the scholarship in a bank account for the girl, contingent on her not marrying
before age 18. Other government programs are restricted to poor families, transferred food allotments
(wheat) to each family if their children attend school 85 percent of the days in the school year
(Arends-Kuenning and Amin, 2000). In Mexico, transfers to the rural poor were started in the fall of
1998 within a program called “Progresa” and by the end of 2000 three million families residing in
small, poor, villages were eligible to receive school and food subsidies. The program seeks to
increase the school enrollment of children from poor families by giving cash grants to mothers whose
children are enrolled in grades three through nine and attend 85 percent of the time. The size of the
transfer payment increases with the child’s grade level to compensate the family approximately for
what a child could earn by working if they did not go to school. The Progresa program transfers
raised on average the consumption levels in eligible poor households by about one-fifth, improved
their nutrition, and increased the expected schooling of their children from 6 to 7 years (Schultz,
2001). Three States in Brazil have experimented for several years with school enrollment bonuses
for poor families, and the Federal government of Brazil enacted legislation in 2001 to extend these
programs to the poor throughout the country in 2002 (Sedlacek, 2001).
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These means-based

educational subsidy programs require methodical planning and careful monitoring to achieve their
objectives of redistributing human capital, but they hold the promise of alleviating poverty while
simultaneously encouraging productive investments among the poor in the nutrition, health and
schooling of their children. These demand stimulating school subsidy programs may turn out to be
more cost-effective in reaching disadvantaged children than traditional public expenditure programs,
which add to the public supply of services, by building more schools (health clinics), or increasing
the salary levels of existing teachers (nurses), or expending more on school (clinic) quality (Schultz,
2001).
African nations might experiment in the design of education subsidy programs targeted to the
children of the poor. These social welfare experiments must be evaluated rigorously to access their
consequences and provide the feedback to improve their design. Experimentation with such programs
in Africa should be undertaken with care, recognizing differences in local institutions and how
programs are implemented from country to country. These demand subsidies to households for
public education programs could help Africa avoid creating the patterns of ingrained economic
inequality that have a grip on Latin America. What role could private education play in this reform
process?
9.

Private and Public Education, Governance, and Accountability
Private educational institutions may help produce the skills that the wage functions reported

in Section 6 indicate are economically most scarce in Africa today. Given the high cost of expanding
public higher education, governments should be reluctant to stand in the way of private firms, though
some forms of regulation of higher education may be justified.16 The private sector may find some
programs of higher education more suitable for specialization than others. Experience in the United
States has led to the view that vocational training, apprenticeships, and some professional programs
may be more successful if organized in the private sector than in the public sector. This may be
because demands for specific types of vocational knowledge change rapidly and private groups
appear to be more flexible and responsive to such evolving labor market derived demands than are
public agencies. In particular, the public sector may be restricted by civil service regulations and
16

Ghana has encouraged the establishment of private universities and is experimenting with the capacity of
private universities to attract emigrants back to the country to teach in these new institutions, after their
training and experiences abroad. Kenya has allowed private universities to fill some of the excess demands for
higher education which the public sector cannot accommodate. Uganda has allowed university fees to become
a major source of funding to expand the provision of higher education and reduce the public subsidies for this
sector, implementing some of the measures discussed in section 8.
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personnel policies, and collective bargaining agreements, which limit its capacity to hire, advance,
and fire employees as new fields of knowledge and technologies grow and decline. This flexibility
may be especially valuable to deliver training programs based on new educational technologies, such
as those fostered by the Internet and allied to distance learning.
Private sector training organizations will need to charge students the full costs of training,
thereby setting a competitive market price for training which should help the public sector adjust its
own structure of fees and tuition toward market-clearing prices. Any excess demand for admission
into the subsidized public sector institutions could then be diverted to private institutions for which
the private costs would probably be higher than in the public sector. Although this development of
private training organizations may create a lower-quality tier of private schools catering to the upper
middle classes, it should help to create a constituency for more competitive tuitions and fees in the
public sector. Examples might be found in terms of business and accounting schools, secretarial
training, and technical skills relevant to the installation and use of new information technologies,
where the government might retain a role of administering proficiency examinations to set standards
on the quality of training individuals receive in the private and public sectors. Public sector resources
may be reallocated toward areas of academic and professional training which require more
infrastructure. These forms of specialization between private and public institutions could lead to
expanding public programs in the physical and biological sciences and engineering, preserving core
studies in mathematics and statistics, social sciences and the key fields of the humanities, justified in
part by more self-financing enrollments. With the increase in fees, students would also have stronger
incentives to complete their studies more quickly.

Independently administered exams for

professional competency could encourage a desirable competition between private and public
training institutions.
Those professions which are employed mostly by the public sector, such as teachers, nurses,
and agricultural extension workers, might be justifiably emphasized in the mix of programs in the
public sector higher educational system, because increasing the number and quality of graduates
from these programs should benefit directly the public sector.

Increasing the supply of these

professionals should contribute to reducing the wage rates which the public sector will need to pay in
the future for its personnel (Schultz, 1987). This argument for public training of teachers, nurses, etc.
may be stronger if the labor market institutions surrounding public employment in a country are
competitive and the public sector regularly evaluates its employees and only renews the contracts of
those employees who are doing an satisfactory job. On the other hand, if these public sector
teaching, nursing, and extension appointments are lifetime sinecures, and are not subject to
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monitoring and work incentives, the public may not gain from increasing their supplies. Instead, the
consequence may be smaller class sizes in education, which may be primarily an amenity valued by
teachers and not an efficient use of public educational resources (e.g. Kimalu, et al., 2001).
Increasing emigration to other countries in the region or to high-income countries signals that
individuals in a particular career or professional occupation are domestically in excess supply in the
national economy, relative to demand, or that career advancement is regulated by bureaucratic rules
and seniority, which discourage entry by the more ambitious and able workers. Before increasing the
public training in such areas of “brain drain,” a careful review of the conditions of employment and
training in the country may identify other constraints and regulations which might be modified to
make domestic employment in the field more attractive and competitive compared with those jobs
available in other countries. Clearly, some of the skills needed are those for which there are good
jobs abroad, and holding on to top scientists, doctors, and engineers will be perennial problem for
low-income countries. Institutions of higher education have a major challenge to restructure their
hiring and advancement policies to reward performance and compete for a suitable number of the
best faculty in critical fields. As long as public institutions of higher education are regulated by civil
servant pay scales and hiring regulations, these institutions will be at a serious disadvantage in
getting and keeping the most talented or the hardest-working faculty.
This raises the complex issue of administration and governance of higher educational
institutions: how to make them responsible at one level to the government and to the public through
transparent financial and output records, and yet introduce decentralized budgeting, personnel
management practices, and incentives to motivate individuals to perform their individual roles and to
cooperate in the joint tasks required of a first-rate system of higher education. Governing boards of
higher educational institutions should be insulated from government interventions, but they must
nonetheless be responsible to the public, which requires the development of special institutions
adapted to higher education as well as local conditions. Transparency of finances is essential, but to
gain control of priority setting, these institutions should decide how to allocate their own revenue
fees, subject to periodic public audits and review.
There has been criticism for many years of setting fees for public higher education too low,
which leads to “excess demand” for university admissions, which tends to favor the upper middleincome classes.17 Political pressures from the groups in Africa which are favored by the current

17

Korea, for example is reported to spend 3.5 percent of its GNP on primary and secondary
education, striving to equalize its quality across regions, while parents spend almost as much on
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system of “free” universities lobby against raising university fees to recover from students a more
equitable share of the public costs of higher education. As a consequence, university faculty are
confronted with growing class sizes, decreasing support for training infrastructure such as
laboratories, computers, and libraries, as well as in many settings decreasing real salaries. Faculty
may hold multiple teaching positions to maintain their standard of living, but this may limit their
capacity to also undertake research which could update their teaching. Empowering professional
societies or teacher unions may strengthen the bargaining position of teachers with regard to their
conditions of work and compensation, but could also weaken competitive pressures on faculty to be
monitored and rewarded accordingly to the quality of their research and teaching. There are good
reasons for insulating university fiscal policy, administration, and curriculum design from political
pressures, and placing them under greater faculty control. These issues of governance in higher
education are as salient in low-income countries as they are in high-income countries, but higher
educational institutions in Africa are in particular need of securing more economic independence of
the government, and self-financing from tuitions could represent a significant first step in that
direction.
The revenues from educational fees may be used to create new programs, to close
unsuccessful ones, to strengthen selectively old ones, to allocate funds for incentive pay and
performance standards among faculty. The use of such new funds in higher education could begin to
remedy many of the entrenched problems that have weakened some outstanding universities in
Africa. The ability to allocate new user fees would give the higher educational governing boards a
flexibility to respond to organizational problems that may be difficult to otherwise reform, and to
initiate new activities for which the social returns are arguably high. Decentralization in resource
allocation and decision-making should be encouraged, down to the Department level or the Research
unit, with the governing board specifying and monitoring the desired outcomes, including degrees
awarded, enrollments and quality of instruction. Faculty involvement in the selection of their peers
to term-positions in University management might also maintain professional standards and reduce
the extent of corruption.
Another of the long-standing organizational challenges facing higher education is to orient its
research and training capacity to problems that have local social and economic importance and have
the promise of generating local social benefits. One linkage that is often difficult to achieve is that

tutoring to purchase an advantage for their children to gain admission to the prestigious public
universities which are “free” (Kim and Lee, 2001).
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between private industry and university researchers which typically involves the practical application
of new knowledge. The industrial firm wants to control the knowledge and innovations it produces
by patents and the like, whereas the university faculty wants to publish their research findings to add
to the base of knowledge which is recognized by their scientific peers. These conflicting incentive
structures of industry and academia also arise in high-income countries, and low-income countries
should look for way to create an environment where private firms and university researchers can pool
resources in well defined situations where both sides stand to benefit and where public interests are
served in the exchange.
Creating an intermediate level of research center, which could be allied to a university but
financially semi-independent, might provide a institutional arrangement for rewarding researchoriented faculty with a supplemental salary, research laboratories, and justified research expenses,
while leaving intact the more uniform compensation scales for faculty who perform satisfactorily
their teaching duties.

Some universities in the United States, for example, have separate, yet

coordinated, institutions which help in the recruitment of outstanding scientists and scholars, offering
a supplemental salary to research faculty on competitively renewable terms of appointment. If
universities are not encouraged to create such independent research centers, they may develop
outside of the university system, in what some countries call “academies of science research
institutions”, and these better paying centers will attract away some of the more creative scientists
from the task of training the next generation.
10. How does HIV/AIDS Affect Returns to Education in Africa?
The repercussions of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa are poorly understood. An empirical
assessment of policy choices to deal with this human tragedy involves evaluating how to invest
economic resource today to enhance the productive capacity of individuals over their future lifetimes,
and should be naturally analyzed within the human capital framework. Individuals make behavioral
choices based on limited knowledge as to how their behavior affects the likelihood that they will
become infected and the consequences of such an infection on themselves and others about whom
they care. The human capital analytical framework is well designed to consider complex choices
individuals make, which involve current costs and have the promise of enhancing the lifetime
consumption opportunities for themselves and others in their nuclear and extended families.
Therefore, human resource economics should be in the forefront, defining the data and directing the
analysis society needs to optimize public sector investments in response to the epidemic, and to
improve understanding of how behavior affects lives.
HIV/AIDS differs from most infectious and communicable diseases, first because of its long
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gestation period, second its link to sensitive areas of sexual behavior, and third its incidence and
mortality differentials by age and by socioeconomic class. The onset of the infection and the
outward manifestations of the disease are separated by about a decade, and during most of this latent
period of HIV infection the disease can be unknowingly transmitted by sexual intercourse, or blood
contact, as can occur by sharing needles for the injection of drugs or transfusions.
Because the mortality caused by HIV/AIDS occurs frequently among adults in the middle of
their working years, aged 30- 45, this disease imposes a heavy economic burden on families and
society, compared with other sources of mortality. In contrast, to most infectious and degenerative
diseases, individuals who die of AIDS tend to be near their peak lifetime productivity, and they
might otherwise expect to enjoy many years of productive work and thereby provide support and care
for others, including their dependent children.
One implication of these characteristics of the AIDS epidemic is that it reduces the private
and public incentives to invest in education. But other developments may mitigate some of these
well-known effects of AIDS on human capital formation. It is said that each year several percent of
the schoolteachers are dying of AIDS in severely affected sub-Saharan African countries, such as
Malawi (Kelly, 2001). These circumstances will contribute to a growing scarcity of teachers, and in
order to attract suitable replacements for the teachers who die, governments will need to pay teachers
higher salaries. The decrease in expected survival of adults would thus diminish the private demand
for schooling, whereas the resulting rise in the salaries of teachers would increase the incentive for
youth to continue their education in order to become a teacher. Firms may also have a diminished
incentive to subsidize on-the-job training of its workers (i.e. firm-specific training), because fewer of
these workers are likely to survive to repay the firm with their enhanced productivity. On the other
hand, firms may expect to encounter rising costs in the future to replace workers who have more onthe-job training
How will new information about the disease diffuse through the population, and what will be
the behavioral consequences of the availability of tests to determine illness status and antiretroviral
drugs to suppress the virus for mother to child transmission and for others. Who will be the first to
adopt new patterns of behavior to reduce transmission risks with the new information and options? 18

18

Representative panel surveys are needed which might document how behavior changes when “a priori”
expectations of infection status are replaced by test results. How do the resulting modifications in prior beliefs
regarding infection status influence transmission-related behavior? (Boozer and Philipson, 2000). The changes
in behavior that occurs because test results are provided should depend on how different the a priori
expectation of the individual’s infection status are from the actual test result. For example, sex workers who
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De Walque (2002) presents estimates of how the gradient of HIV infection with respect to
schooling has changed for a rural Uganda population followed over time. The partial correlation of
education with the incidence of HIV is initially in 1989 positive, and has become significantly
negative a decade later in 2000. If this change in the educational gradient in the rate of new infection
is a general feature of the epidemic in Africa, as improved information about the disease becomes
available, and the observed association between education and infection can be interpreted as causal,
then education may both raise the labor productivity of surviving individuals and increase life
expectancy by reducing HIV infection, and thereby would be expected to increase the returns to
schooling.
AIDS prevention programs could involve two components, the first providing information
about the disease and behavioral changes that can reduce the risk of infection or transmission, and the
second subsidized diagnostic testing for HIV infection and confidential consultation with the tested
individuals on how to interpret and react to their own test. In the Uganda panel study mentioned
earlier, de Walque (2002) reports that the probability that a condom was used in the last sexual
intercourse increased over time more rapidly for educated than for less educated individuals in the
panel, especially for women, suggesting one behavioral mechanism which could account for the
change in the education gradient in infection rates. The speed at which these changes in HIV/AIDS
related behavior, infection rates, and prevalence rates occur is likely to depend on regional mobility
of the population, initial patterns of sexual behavior, among many other factors, and how these
factors differ across socioeconomic strata of each society (Ainsworth and Over, 1997; Kelly, 2001).
Unless negative externalities can be confidently attributed to the dissemination of
information, both with regard to the characteristics of a communicable disease and the individuals
own infection status, information should be provided to as many people as possible. Otherwise,
better-educated and richer individuals will have an advantage due to their knowledge about the
disease, and have themselves privately tested to derive whatever welfare advantage from modifying
their behavior and seeking drugs. Unless a strong case can be made for withholding information

think they have contracted HIV/AIDS may have more reason to change their behavior if they learn that they
are not currently infected, and may thus change their occupation to reduce their exposure to risks of infection
in the future. How behavior changes in response to testing and counseling depends on a subtle balancing of
altruistic and selfish motivations, and the alternative income opportunities individuals have to obtain support
for themselves and their families while reducing their exposure to risks. These are complex choices for which
empirical analysis is essential, because theory (or the intuition of physicians, policy makers or economic
theorists) is not a sufficiently reliable basis for policy choices.
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about AIDS from private individuals, testing should be encouraged, and public subsidies should be
provided to spread the information from these test to all those who are tested.
Individuals may treat persons suspected of being infected by HIV/AIDS in a different
manner (i.e. stigma) than they do those who they think are uninfected.

Isolation from social

networks due to being classified as probably HIV/AIDS-positive may not only cause psychological
stress for the shunned individual, it may weaken family and neighborhood institutions which
otherwise provide many poor people with the means to protect themselves and their families against
the losses associated with chronic health crises. It may lead to the exclusion from school of orphaned
children or children of sick parents (Gertler, et al., 2002). Providing orphans with legal rights to
attend school system, could reduce the likelihood that the next generation will fall into poverty
(Ainsworth and Filmer, 2002).
Without knowledge of who is sick, and how behavior changes when individuals become HIV
positive, and then manifestly ill with AIDS, and related opportunistic diseases (such as TB and
pneumonia), the direct consequences of the epidemic remain difficult to appraise. Unless variation in
access to prevention and treatment programs can be related across residential areas and over time to
incidence and prevalence rates, statistical assessments of the impact of program interventions will
remain highly uncertain and public policy will be left to the intuition of political leaders.
11.

Conclusions, Policy Implications and Research Priorities
There are three interrelated issues in the design of an efficient and equitable educational

system. First, the productivity of similar workers with different levels of schooling must be assessed.
Second, the personal distribution of the benefits of an educational program should not add to
economic inequalities, and if possible reduce them. Third, the specified levels of education should
be produced at least private and public cost.
This paper has dealt primarily with the first question of how the private productivity of wage
workers differs according to their education, as observed in recent household sample surveys from
six African countries. The second question is inescapable because the highest private returns to
education are associated with post-secondary schooling, for which the benefits are most unequally
distributed. The third question has been neglected in this paper. It involves the design of public
policy interventions in order to minimize the public and private costs of educational outcomes: (1)
increasing the years of schooling youth complete, or (2) increasing the labor market productivity of a
worker with an additional year of schooling, or (3) enhancing other welfare benefits enjoyed by
students. These efforts to improve the operational efficiency of the educational system are
commonly evaluated by means of retrospective analysis of program outcomes, such as student
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enrollments, matriculations, and test performance. The units of analysis may be administrative
regions, communities, schools or even classrooms, for which the level and variety of school inputs or
administrative structure of incentives vary. But such variation in school inputs and organization
rarely occurs independently of other confounding factors which are also likely to affect school
outcomes. The underlying conditions which give rise to the variation in schools will tend to be
correlated with student family background, regional population characteristics, and other school
attributes, all of which influence school outcomes. Therefore retrospective relationships between
measured school inputs and outcomes, often called school production functions, can and do produce
misleading estimates of the consequences of policy changes (Kremer, 2000). This problem is
illustrated in Kenya by Glevve and Kremer (forthcoming), where an intervention providing
promising school inputs was evaluated retrospectively, and then evaluated prospectively by
systematically administering the input to a random set of schools and also studying the same
educational outcomes in a random set of “control” schools. The retrospective study concluded the
inputs were cost effective, and the randomized social experiment could find no significant effect of
the inputs on school outcomes. The added cost and time of prospective randomized program
evaluation may be warranted in setting educational policies, in order to be confident that confounding
factors do not bias retrospective evaluation studies.
Analysis of the economic productivity of employees who are trained by the educational
system and continue to work in Africa is one way to infer the contribution of education to the
economy and to the development of the continent. A comprehensive evaluation of education would
require an assessment of both the private wage returns to schooling, which are essential to motivate
families to educate their children, and the public accounts of benefits and net public expenditures on
schooling, which together with the private returns define the social returns to education (Table 1).
The equity of public subsidies for higher education is a disquieting problem for Africa, because
higher education in Africa absorbs relatively large public subsidies per student, and benefits accrue
disproportionately to the children of relatively well-off families. Can expansion of higher education
in Africa be restructured to return more of the benefits of higher education to relatively poor
families?

The standard policies which might accomplish this redirection of benefits of higher

education to the poor involves having the rich and middle classes paying more of the costs of the
higher education, which they currently consume, and thereby reduce the subsidies per student. The
additional tuitions and educational fees thus collected could make a substantial difference by
augmenting the funds available for fellowships for the poor.
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In this paper, I have assembled empirical evidence from household surveys collected from
1985 to 1999 in six African countries --- Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya and South Africa, Nigeria and
Burkina Faso. Workers are receiving higher wages to compensate them for having enrolled in
education, and the wage gains associated with each year of education completed range from about 5
to 20 percent, if we exclude the extraordinary wage returns of Africans in South Africa. The private
rates of return to higher education are relatively attractive by world standards, 10 – 15 percent,
suggesting that private families and individuals in Africa currently have a strong financial incentive
to acquire more higher education. But can the poor attain these substantial returns only if they first
complete the primary level for which returns appear to be modest, on the order of 3-10 percent?
If there are benefits to education, which accrue to members of society other than the students
and their families, methods should be developed to evaluate these social external returns. This task is
daunting and controversial, but a start should be made to extend the analyses reported here of the
private wage returns to include first the public costs of providing the education, and second
defensible estimates of the value of social externalities generated by education for the wider society.
It is not satisfactory to dismiss private wage returns to schooling in a low-income country because
they are incomplete or imperfect, which they certainly are. The claims on public revenues for
education should be based on quantifiable cost-effectiveness accounting, going forward.
Although in some African countries, such as Kenya, women have made strides in general
education, the gender gap in schooling remains large in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Burkina
Faso. By contrast, the gender gap in education is not evident in South Africa. Since there are
persuasive reasons to think that educating more women will improve the health and schooling of
their children, as well as reduce fertility and slow population growth, such spillover effects of female
education can be interpreted as a social externality justifying an extra social subsidy for female
education. But these arguments for governments investing more in women’s education are better
documented at the basic primary and secondary school levels than they are for higher education
(Schultz, 2002).
The major drawback of higher education in Africa is that it benefits children who are mostly
from upper economic classes, living in urban areas, whose parents are well educated relative to the
standards of their generation. In other words, higher education is heavily subsidized by government,
and financially benefits predominantly the upper classes, and thus increases future economic
inequalities in Africa. These inter-generational patterns of low educational mobility were illustrated
in two African countries in Table 9. Nonetheless, comparisons of Africa with other low-income
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regions, such as those in Latin America or South Asia, may indicate that Africa is no more unequal in
its distribution of educational benefits than elsewhere (King, 1997).
Unless a mechanism is found for improving the personal distribution of the benefits of higher
education, it is not clear on what basis international development agencies, private foundations, or
other non-government organizations can justify further expansion of higher education in Africa.
Governments in the region do not appear to assign a high priority to improving the quality of higher
education, or encouraging higher education to evolve toward a self-governing status. Primary and
secondary levels of education, programs favoring women’s education, programs in preventive and
public health such as would slow the spread of AIDS, would all seem to exhibit a stronger claim on
public funding in Africa. This is because the benefits from these alternative social welfare programs
are more widely distributed across all classes in the society than is currently the case with higher
education.
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Table 1

Benefits and Costs of Schooling Which Determine Private, Public and Social Returns to
Schooling
Who Benefits and
Pays for Schooling ?

Benefits Caused by
Schooling

Costs Incurred to
Produce Schooling

1.
Private incentives for
student-family to
enroll in school

1A.
Increased wage
opportunities after
taxes

1B.
Value of student’s
time while going to
school

Increased
consumer benefits

Direct financial
expenses, fees, etc.

2.
Public sector
accounts of
schooling beyond the
family

2A.
Social externalities
e.g. reduced
exposure to disease
and crime

2B.
Public expenditures
on education minus
fees and taxes paid
over a lifetime

2C.
Public sector rate of
return

3.
Social accounts

3A.
Private and public
benefits

3B.
Private and public
costs

3C.
Social rate of return
that equalizes the
present discounted
value of social
benefits and costs.
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Net Rate of Return to
Schooling Over a
Lifetime
1C.
Private rate of return
that equalizes the
present discounted
value of private
benefits and costs

Table 2: Log Wage Function Estimates for Ghana in 1987, 1988, 1991, and 1998, by Gender.
1987

1988

1991

1998

Years of
Schooling
Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Regression Coefficients (Omitted category is no schooling)
Some Primary

4

.289

.203

.219

.389

.241

.303

.337

.098

Middle Certificate

10

.574

.160

.477

.640

.563

.437

.615

.390

Secondary Certificate

15

1.135

.334

1.054

1.224

1.063

.834

1.107

1.148

Commercial/Vocational

5-12

.520

.256

.380

.733

.960

.316

.875

.774

Teacher/Nurse/
Technical Certificate
University

17
19

1.297
1.701

1.087
1.409

1.304
1.779

1.464
1.398

1.555
1.778

1.448
1.721

1.391
2.098

1.400
1.143

Rural Resident

–

-.521

-.557

-.348

-.596

-.357

-.484

-.469

-.461

R2

–

.138

.080

.117

.111

.180

.152

.181

.133

Mean of Dependent Variable (log
hourly wage)

3.40

3.19

3.46

3.16

4.44

4.26

6.06

5.81

(Standard Deviation)

(1.19)

(1.36)

(1.21)

(1.42)

(.991)

(1.09)

(1.15)

(1.15)

Sample Size
Implied Private Rate of Return in Percent per Annum

1555

1444

1715

1617

1989

1878

2669

2788

(Primary - None)

4

7.2

5.1

5.5

9.7

6.0

7.6

8.4

2.5

(Middle - Primary)

6

4.8

-.7

4.3

4.2

5.4

2.2

4.6

4.9

(Secondary - Middle)

5

11.

2.6

12.

12.

10.

8.0

9.8

15.

(University – Secondary)

4

14.

27.

18.

4.4

18.

22.

25.

-0.1

Also includes post-schooling experience and experience squared

35

Table 3: Log Wage Function Estimates for Ghana 1987 and 1998, by Age and Gender.
1987

1998

Years of
Schooling
Age 25-34

Age 35-44

Age 25-34

Age 35-54

Male
Regression Coefficients (Omitted category is no schooling)
Some Primary
4
.359
Middle Certificate
10
.585

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

.249
.412

.261
.615

.250
.132

.425
.660

.301
.502

.311
.625

-.114
.175

Secondary Certificate
Commercial/Vocational

15
5-12

1.321
.832

.815
.615

1.160
.357

1.041
.247

1.243
.849

1.178
.758

1.073
.905

.991
.584

Teacher/Nurse
Technical Certificate
University

17
19

1.567
2.268

1.487
2.973

1.173
1.449

1.147
1.289

1.392
3.022

1.534
2.191

1.413
1.861

1.125
.203

Rural Resident

–

-.533

-.364

-.513

-.740

-.537

-.476

-.435

-.448

R2

–

.125

.057

.151

.104

.164

.123

.190

.150

Mean of Dependent
Variable (log hourly wage)

3.31

3.30

3.48

3.09

5.99

5.76

6.10

5.84

(Standard Deviation)

(1.20)

(1.35)

(1.18)

(1.36)

(1.12)

(1.11)

(1.17)

(1.37)

Sample Size
Implied Private Rate of Return in Percent per Annum

672

676

883

768

938

1132

1731

1656

(Primary - None)

4

9.0

6.2

6.5

6.3

11.

7.5

7.8

-2.9

(Middle - Primary)

6

3.8

2.7

5.9

-2.0

3.9

3.4

5.2

4.8

(Secondary - Middle)

5

15.

8.1

9.9

18.

12.

14.

9.0

16.

(University – Secondary)

4

24.

54.

5.8

6.2

44.

25.

20.

-20. *

*

Also includes post-schooling experience and experience squared
Based on only a few females age 35-54 with a

university

degree
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and

working

for

a

wage

in

this

year’s

sample

survey.

Table 4
Log Wage Function Estimates for Côte d’Ivoire in 1985-87, by Age and Gender
Years of
Schooling

Age 25-34
Male

Age 35-54
Female

Male

Female

Regression Coefficients (Omitted category is no schooling)
Some Primary

4

.342

.353

.483

.674

Primary Certificate

6

.920

.270

1.043

.624

Middle Certificate

10

1.474

.653

1.502

.775

Secondary Certificate

12

1.903

.887

2.013

1.333

Tech & Professional

6-11

.338

.201

.185

.590

University

17

2.703

1.069

2.191

2.754

Rural Resident

–

-.479

-1.21

-.718

-1.35

R2

–

.389

.332

.353

.270

Mean of Dependent
Variable (log hourly wage)

5.71

5.10

5.63

4.73

(Standard Deviation)

(2.14)

(2.79)

(2.11)

(2.96)

Sample Size
867
Implied Private Rate of Return in Percent per Annum

666

1355

928

(Primary - None)

6

15.

4.5

17.

10.

(Middle - Primary)

4

14.

9.6

12.

3.8

(Secondary - Middle)

2

22.

12.

26.

28.

(University - Secondary)

5

16.

3.6

3.6

28.

Also includes post-schooling experience and experience squared
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Table 5
Log Wage Function Estimates for Kenya in 1994, by Age and Gender
Years of
Schooling

Age 25-34
Male

Age 35-54
Female

Male

Female

Regression Coefficients Ø (Omitted category is no schooling)
Some Primary

6

.574

.561

.584

.138

Middle Certificate

8

.857

.651

.814

.462

Secondary Certificate

12

1.151

1.397

1.279

1.206

Vocational/Tech

10-14

1.531

1.772

1.507

1.580

University

16

1.983

2.452

1.784

1.858

Rural Resident

–

-.603

-.943

-.681

-.901

R2

–

.151

.193

.208

.167

Mean of Dependent
Variable (log hourly wage)

2.27

1.51

2.22

1.45

(Standard Deviation)

(1.17)

(1.32)

(1.26)

(1.29)

Sample Size
2625
Implied Private Wage Returns in Percent per Annum

2290

3401

2210

(Middle - None)

8

11.

8.1

10.

5.8

(Secondary - Middle)

4

7.4

20.

12.

19.

(University - Secondary)

4

21.

26.

13.

16.

Ø Also includes post-schooling experience and experience squared.
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Table 6 : Estimates of Wage Returns to Schooling by Level in South Africa in 1993, by Race, Gender and AgeØ

Years of
Schooling

Whites

Africans
25-34

35-54

25-34

35-54

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Regression Coefficients (Omitted Category is no schooling)
Some

6-8

.293

.348

.465

.636

.083

.309

.734

-.246

Junior Secondary

10

.728

.986

.872

1.291

.142

-.345

.195

-.315

Secondary

12

1.184

1.614

1.245

1.869

.546

.215

.668

-.069

Technical/Nurse/Teacher

12-14

1.819

2.510

1.752

2.553

.870

.337

.793

.281

University

16

2.448

3.438

2.389

2.908

1.365

.713

1.137

.488

Rural

–

-.476

-.339

-.555

-.394

-.227

-.461

-.040

-.031

R2

–

.360

.450

.346

.469

.247

.204

.151

.249

Mean of Dependent Variable
(log hourly wage)
(Standard Deviation)
Sample Size
Implied Private Rate of Return in Percent per Annum

1.46

1.12

1.53

1.08

3.19

2.75

3.41

2.79

(.890)
850

(1.09)
541

(.979)
1115

(1.07)
767

(.598)
214

(.612)
192

(.746)
317

(.526)
541

Junior Secondary - None

10

7.3

9.6

8.8

13.

1.4

-3.4

1.9

-3.1

Secondary - Junior Secondary

2

22.

32.

18.

28.

20.

28.

24.

12.

University - Secondary

4

32.

46.

29.

26.

20.

12.

12.

14.

ØThe wage analyzed here is based on the sample for which the cash wage is positive and expressed as an hourly cash wage. A few additional individuals also report
income in-kind (food, housing, transportation, etc.). Summing these cash and in-kind income per hour leads to a wage with more outlying values that are less plausible,
perhaps because the units of time, such as per day, leads to some large and some very small in-kind wage rates per hour.
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Table 7: Spline Estimates of Wage Returns to Schooling in Nigeria: 1996-1999
Age Group
Sex

15-64
Male

25-34
Female

Male

35-44

45-64

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Spline estimates of Wage Return per year of Schooling
Primary School
(1-6)
Secondary School
(1-6)
Post-Secondary
School (1-4)

.025

.024

.016

.008

.013

.021

.041

.045

.039

.044

.040

.072

.039

.031

.042

.042

.104

.122

.127

.138

.120

.136

.095

.100

Sample Wage
Earners
Sample All Persons

9,065

3,135

2,657

1,273

3,330

1,079

2,710

454

100, 872

104, 864

21, 433

31, 772

21, 819

23, 040

27, 129

17, 908

Means of Schooling of Wage Earner Samples
Primary

5.38

5.40

5.58

5.66

5.50

5.41

5.09

4.59

Secondary

3.98

4.29

4.39

4.58

4.16

4.31

3.46

3.48

Post Secondary

0.64

0.76

0.52

0.74

0.75

0.94

0.70

0.81

Total Years

10.00

10.49

10.50

10.99

10.42

10.67

9.26

8.89

3.53

5.75

3.41

4.44

2.61

3.07

1.65

Means All Persons
Total Years of
5.19
Schooling
Source: Aromolaran(2002).
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Table 8: Estimates of Private Wage Returns to Schooling in Burkina: 1994, 1998

Male

1994
Female

Male

1998
Female

Spline Coefficients on Years of
Schooling:
Primary (1-6)

0.101

0.190

0.079

0.071

Secondary (-7)

0.172

0.161

0.109

0.144

Post Secondary (2)

0.174

0.192

0.129

0.160

Rural Resident

-0.020

-0.170

-0.012

0.079

R2

0.51

0.62

0.41

0.56

Mean of Dependant Variable
(log of Monthly Wage in CFA)

10.63

10.57

10.64

10.64

(Standard Deviation)

(.89)

(1.01)

(.94)

(1.02)

Sample Size of Wage Earners

1253

269

1265

284

Source: Kaizianga (2002)
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Table 9: Proportion of Children with Any Higher Education in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, by Child Age, Sex and Parents’ Education
Sons by Age

Daughters by Age

Ghana 1987-88

25 - 34

35 - 44

45 - 54

55+

25 - 34

35 - 44

45 - 54

55+

All Persons
(Sample Size)
Father’s Highest Education
None

.067
(1722)

.088
(1188)

.048
(876)

.018
(1140)

.018
(2205)

.023
(1299)

.010
(1077)

.004
(1353)

.053

.061

.035

.012

.007

.010

.005

.002

Primarya

.091

.245

.095

.076

.041

.076

.028

.028

Secondarya or more

.238

.176

.462

.400

.083

.171

.143

.000

None

.059

.077

.045

.015

.015

.014

.006

.002

Primary

.148

.295

.091

.091

.051

.154

.143

.103

Secondary or more

.417

1.00

1.00

1.00

.120

.455

.333

.000

Mother’s Highest Education

Côte d’Ivoire 1985-87
All Persons
(Sample Size)
Father’s Highest Education
None

.111
(2000)

.066
(1301)

.022
(1161)

.004
(1535)

.028
(2605)

.007
(1835)

.002
(1395)

.001
(1405)

.085

.054

.017

.003

.009

.004

.001

.000

Primaryb

.272

.170

.083

.000

.140

.077

.080

.143

Secondaryb or more

.301

.304

.429

.667

.404

.150

.000

.000

None

.105

.064

.020

.004

.020

.007

.002

.001

Primary

.257

.222

.000

.289

.000

.000

.000

Secondary or more

.778

1.00

1.00

.733

.333

Mother’s Highest Education

˜Mean is based on a cell of less than ten persons
Cell is empty
a
Primary and Middle combined for first tens years of primary, followed by five years of Secondary.
b
Primary is six years and Secondary is six years.
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Table 10
Educational attainment of Respondents Age 25-54, Fitted to Geographic Areas of
Residence and Father’s and Mother’s Schooling
(absolute values of t ratios reported in parentheses beneath regression
coefficients)
Ghana 1987-88

Côte d’Ivoire 1985-87

Male

Female

Male

Female

Age Squared/100
R2

-2.94
(16.)
1.54
(6.09)
.130
(3.04)
.300
(13.)
.400
(4.81)
-.746
(5.89)
.234

-1.86
(14.)
1.66
(8.57)
.294
(10.4)
.318
(20.)
.161
(4.14)
-.373
(4.14)
.343

-2.79
(18.)
1.24
(6.98)
.233
(2.35)
.521
(16.)
.300
(4.07)
-.541
(5.66)
.311

-9.07
(10.9)
(13.)
.333
.333
(6.67)
.615
(29.)
-1.90
(4.90)
.158
(3.14)
.369

Sample Size

3643

4419

4451

5838

Mean of Schooling Years
[Standard Deviation]

7.16
[5.64]

3.80
[4.91]

3.77
[5.01]

1.29
[3.15]

Regression Coefficients a
Rural
(other urban omitted category)
Capital City
Mother’s Schooling Years
Father’s Schooling Years
Age Years

Also included dummies for year of survey and whether the education of the mother or
father is missing, in which case the parent education is set equal to the mean of parents
reporting in the sample.
a
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Figure 1.
Average Schooling Completed in Ghana by Age and Sex : 1987/88
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Figure 2.
Average Schooling Completed in Côte d’Ivoire by Age and Sex : 1985/86
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Figure 3.
Average Schooling Completed in Kenya by Age and Sex : 1994
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Figure 4.
Average Schooling Completed in South Africa by Age, Sex, and Africans and Whites
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Figure 5.
Average Schooling Completed in Nigeria by Age and Sex : 1996-99
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80

Figure 6.
Average Schooling Completed in Burkina by Age and Sex: 1994
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